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ABSTRACT—Contrary to popular opinion, arbitration under the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA) is not intended to be forced or unfair, including in the
employment context. Indeed, § 2 of the FAA permits courts to refuse
enforcement of arbitration agreements on the basis of generally applicable
state contract law defenses, such as unconscionability, in order to safeguard
against potential abuse of the arbitral process. Yet decisions such as that of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Campbell v.
Keagle threaten to nullify the FAA’s protections and reinforce the perception
of arbitration as an unjust process. The district court in this case found that
the parties’ employment arbitration clause was inordinately one-sided in the
employer’s favor and that the offending provisions could not be severed
under Illinois law to compel arbitration. Thus, the arbitration clause was
unenforceable under § 2 of the FAA. The Seventh Circuit reversed, but not
on the basis of state contract law. Rather, the court of appeals enforced the
parties’ agreement to arbitrate on the basis of subsequent procedural
provisions of the FAA, namely §§ 4 and 5. This Essay argues that the
Seventh Circuit’s reliance on these provisions to circumvent the district
court’s finding of unconscionability under § 2 of the FAA ignores the
significance of the FAA’s internal sequencing. An arbitration agreement
found unenforceable under § 2—the substantive section of the FAA—
cannot escape its fate because of the Act’s subsequent procedural provisions.
The Seventh Circuit’s decision also conflicts with Supreme Court
jurisprudence and creates a circuit split regarding the interrelationship
between §§ 2, 4, and 5 of the Act. This Essay concludes that while the
Seventh Circuit enforced the parties’ arbitration agreement in Campbell v.
Keagle, its reasoning does not benefit FAA arbitration. It sets a dangerous
precedent for future cases involving unconscionable arbitration agreements
and fuels the growing backlash against employment arbitration under the
FAA.
AUTHOR—Associate Professor, University of Alberta Faculty of Law. The
author thanks Professor Jeremy Telman for his helpful comments on an
earlier draft.
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INTRODUCTION
Arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) has increasingly
come under attack for being an unfair and unequal dispute resolution process,
especially in the context of employment disputes.1 Claims that employers use
arbitration to evade public and legal accountability have even led to a recent
amendment to the FAA banning predispute arbitration agreements in
employment-related sexual assault or sexual harassment disputes.2 Opinions
differ on whether this amendment will ease the burden on employees
bringing claims against employers.3 Nevertheless, the amendment was
clearly a response to the widely held perception that arbitration in the
employment context is a “forced” dispute resolution process that employers

1
For present purposes, “employment” disputes do not include labor disputes involving unions, in
which context arbitration is frequently used pursuant to other federal statutes, such as the Labor
Management Relations Act of 1947 § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185. The Supreme Court has interpreted this
legislation as “express[ing] a federal policy that federal courts should enforce [arbitration] agreements on
behalf of or against labor organizations and that industrial peace can be best obtained only in that way.”
Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 455 (1957); see also Century Indem. Co.
v. Brooklyn Union Gas Co., No. 603405/2001, 2022 WL 761822, at *10 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 14, 2022)
(referring to “labor arbitrations pursuant to a collective-bargaining agreement [as] a frequent, recurring
activity”).
2
See Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021, Pub. L. No.
117-90, 136 Stat. 26 (2022). This is the first substantive amendment to the FAA since its passage in 1925.
David Horton, The Limits of the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment
Act, 132 YALE L.J.F. 1, 1–2 (2022). Another piece of arbitration-related legislation that recently passed
in the House of Representatives is the Forced Arbitration Injustice Repeal (FAIR) Act of 2022, which
prohibits predispute agreements requiring arbitration of employment, consumer, antitrust, or civil rights
disputes. H.R. 963, 117th Cong. (as passed by House, Mar. 21, 2022).
3
Compare Amy B Wang & Eugene Scott, Biden Signs Bill Ending Forced Arbitration in Sexual
Assault, Harassment Cases, WASH. POST (Mar. 3, 2022, 1:38 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
politics/2022/03/03/biden-signs-new-law-ending-forced-arbitration-sex-assault-harassment/ [https://per
ma.cc/7RSF-2ME6] (citing arguments made by proponents of the amendment), with Sarah R. Cole The
End of ‘Forced’ Arbitration Isn’t the Beginning of Corporate Transparency, HILL (Feb. 17, 2022,
11:01 AM),https://thehill.com/opinion/judiciary/594533-the-end-of-forced-arbitration-isnt-thebeginning-of-corporate-transparency/ [https://perma.cc/M6KE-L6A8] (arguing that the secrecy
surrounding sexual harassment or abuse claims will not be resolved by this amendment because it
emanates from nondisclosure agreements rather than arbitration agreements), and Horton, supra note 2,
at 2 (noting that “the Ending Forced Arbitration Act only applies if the FAA applies. But the FAA contains
several exceptions, and if a case falls into one of these fissures in federal arbitration law, it must be
decided under state law. In sharp contrast to the conventional wisdom, many states require arbitration in
contexts that the FAA does not”).
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control and design as they see fit, and then bury in nonnegotiable standard
form contracts with big words and small fonts.4
But arbitration under the FAA, even before the Act’s latest amendment,
was never designed to be forced or unfair. Arbitration “is a matter of consent,
not coercion,”5 and arbitration agreements are to be “treated like all other
contracts.”6 While the FAA provides that written arbitration agreements
“shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable,”7 this statutory requirement to
specifically enforce arbitration agreements does not mean that all arbitration
agreements, no matter their terms or the manner in which they were created,
must be enforced by the courts. To the contrary, § 2 of the FAA explicitly
permits courts to refuse to enforce arbitration agreements “upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”8 The
Supreme Court has recognized that this “saving clause” allows courts to
refuse to enforce arbitration agreements under state law, on the basis of
“generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or
unconscionability.”9 Indeed, state and federal courts across the country have
routinely held arbitration agreements or specific provisions of those
agreements to be unenforceable under § 2’s “saving clause,” most commonly
on the basis of the “generally applicable contract defense” of
unconscionability.10 Such findings of unconscionability have served as
4
See, e.g., Horton, supra note 2, at 2 (noting that commentators called the amendment “a ringing
victory for critics of forced arbitration”); Sheya Rivard, Leaving “Sex” Out of It: Amending the Federal
Arbitration Act to Ensure Bostock’s Victory for LGBTQ Employee Rights, 27 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L.
REV. 159, 183 (2022) (noting that the amendment was supported by social movements that share the
“conviction that mandatory arbitration protects perpetrators of sexual harassment and leaves victims with
no recourse aside from stifling arbitration procedures”).
5
Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407, 1415 (2019).
6
Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 447 (2006).
7
9 U.S.C. § 2. This section is “a congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring
arbitration agreements.” Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
8
9 U.S.C. § 2. However, such grounds cannot constitute “defenses that apply only to arbitration or
that derive their meaning from the fact that an agreement to arbitrate is at issue.” AT&T Mobility LLC v.
Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011).
9
Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1622 (2018).
10
See, e.g., Beltran v. AuPairCare, Inc., 907 F.3d 1240, 1263 (10th Cir. 2018) (refusing to enforce
a provision of an arbitration agreement allowing the defendant to choose the arbitrator because it was
substantively unconscionable); Alexander v. Anthony Int’l, L.P., 341 F.3d 256, 270, 272 (3d Cir. 2003)
(refusing to enforce an arbitration agreement because it contained unreasonable time limits to submit a
claim and had a “loser pays” provision, both of which the court found to be unconscionable); Iberia Credit
Bureau, Inc. v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 379 F.3d 159, 171 (5th Cir. 2004) (refusing to enforce an
arbitration agreement because it provided for an unconscionable one-sided duty to arbitrate); In re
Checking Acct. Overdraft Litig., 485 Fed. App’x 403, 406 (11th Cir. 2012) (refusing to enforce a costand-fee-shifting provision of an arbitration agreement on the grounds of unconscionability); Hadnot v.
Bay, Ltd., 344 F.3d 474, 478 (5th Cir. 2003) (severing a provision of an arbitration agreement that limited
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important safeguards against potential abuse of the arbitral process, precisely
as the FAA envisioned.
Yet a recent decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit threatens to nullify the protections of § 2’s “saving
clause”—creating a circuit split and reinforcing the perception of arbitration
as a “forced” dispute resolution mechanism. Campbell v. Keagle, Inc.
involved an entertainer who sued the bar that employed her and its owner–
manager in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of Illinois for
violations of federal and state employment statutes.11 Defendants filed a
motion to compel arbitration of plaintiff’s claims pursuant to the parties’
agreement, which contained an arbitration clause providing that any dispute
between the parties shall be decided by arbitration pursuant to the FAA.12
The arbitration clause further provided that defendants had “the right to
choose the arbitrator and location of any such proceedings” and that plaintiff
“will pay the cost of [her] arbitration and legal costs, regardless of the
outcome of any such action.”13
Plaintiff argued that the arbitration clause was unconscionable and
therefore unenforceable.14 The district court agreed, finding that the
arbitration clause was “inordinately one-sided in Defendant’s favor” and that
the unconscionable provisions could not be severed under Illinois law in
statutory remedies in a way that the court found to be unconscionable); Al-Safin v. Cir. City Stores, Inc.,
394 F.3d 1254, 1262 (9th Cir. 2005) (refusing to enforce an arbitration agreement because it was
“permeated with unconscionable provisions”); Ward v. Crow Vote LLC, No. 21-cv-01110-JVS,
2021 WL 5927803, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2021) (refusing to enforce a confidentiality provision of an
arbitration agreement because it was unconscionable); Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs.,
Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 698–99 (Cal. 2000) (refusing to enforce an arbitration agreement because it provided
for an unconscionable one-sided duty to arbitrate); In re Poly-America, L.P., 262 S.W.3d 337, 360–61
(Tex. 2008) (refusing to enforce a provision of an arbitration agreement that limited statutory remedies
because it was unconscionable); Casa Ford, Inc. v. Armendariz, No. 08-20-00084-CV, 2021 WL
3721718, at *4 (Tex. Ct. App. Aug. 23, 2021) (refusing to enforce an unconscionable provision of an
arbitration agreement that limited remedies afforded by state law).
11
Campbell v. Keagle, Inc., 553 F. Supp. 3d 492, 494 (C.D. Ill. 2021). For additional commentary
on the decision, see Jeremy Telman, Judge Easterbrook: Arbitration for All!, LAW PROFESSOR BLOGS
NETWORK: CONTRACTSPROF BLOG (Mar. 8, 2022), https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/contractsprof_
blog/2022/03/judge-easterbrook-arbitration-for-all.html [https://perma.cc/4YPD-MCPK].
12
See Campbell, 553 F. Supp. 3d at 494.
13
The complete arbitration clause read as follows:
Any controversy, dispute or claim arising out of this lease or otherwise from me entertaining at
the premises of this club shall be exclusively decided by binding arbitration under the Federal
Arbitration Act. The owners of the Silver Bullet Bar reserve the right to choose the arbitrator and
location of any such proceedings. I agree that all claims between me and the Silver Bullet Bar, its
owners, or management will not be litigated individually and that I will not consolidate or file a
class suit for any claim against the Silver Bullet Bar, its owners, or management. I will pay the
cost of my arbitration and legal costs, regardless of the outcome of any such action.
Id. at 494–95.
14
Id. at 495.
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order to compel arbitration.15 Defendants appealed only the district court’s
refusal to sever the unconscionable provisions and enforce the parties’
agreement to arbitrate.16
The Seventh Circuit seemed to suggest that it might have overturned
the district court’s finding of unconscionability under Illinois law had the
defendants appealed it.17 This suggestion is disconcerting in itself, but it will
not be addressed in this Essay because the court ultimately did not decide the
issue.18 More importantly for present purposes, the Seventh Circuit found
that the parties’ agreement to arbitrate should be enforced.19 The court’s
conclusion was based not on Illinois law, but rather on §§ 4 and 5 of the
FAA.20 Section 4 of the FAA authorizes courts to order arbitration in the
district where a petition for such an order is filed,21 while § 5 authorizes
courts to appoint an arbitrator in certain circumstances.22 This Essay focuses
15

Id. at 498–99.
Campbell v. Keagle Inc., 27 F.4th 584, 586 (7th Cir. 2022) (Defendant “maintains that its only
goal is to arbitrate rather than litigate—that the details don’t matter, so the judge may fill in the blanks.
This is its sole argument on appeal.”), reh'g denied, No. 21-2256, 2022 WL 1009565 (7th Cir. April 4,
2022).
17
See id. at 585–86.
18
A finding that the arbitration clause at issue in Campbell v. Keagle is not unconscionable would
have been contrary to previous decisions of both the Illinois state courts and the Seventh Circuit itself,
which have found similar provisions in arbitration clauses unconscionable. See, e.g., Jackson v. Payday
Fin., LLC, 764 F.3d 765, 779 n.37 (7th Cir. 2014) (noting that the Seventh Circuit has “refused to enforce
an arbitration agreement where the obligation was so one-sided as to make any genuine obligation
illusory”); McCaskill v. SCI Mgmt. Corp., 298 F.3d 677, 680 (7th Cir. 2002) (refusing to enforce an
arbitration clause because it prohibited “the recovery of attorney’s fees in any situation”); Potiyevskiy v.
TM Transp., Inc., No. 1–13–1864, 2013 WL 6199949, at *8–*9 (Ill. App. Ct. Nov. 25, 2013) (holding
that the arbitration agreement was substantively unconscionable because it required arbitration of disputes
outside the employee’s state of residence and because the arbitration fees made claims cost-prohibitive).
For other state and federal courts’ findings of unconscionability, see supra note 10.
19
Campbell, 27 F.4th at 586–87 (“[T]he mutual assent to arbitration remains, and a federal judge
should implement the parties’ decision whenever possible.”).
20
See id. at 586.
21
This section provides as follows, in relevant part:
16

A party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another to arbitrate under a written
agreement for arbitration may petition any United States district court which, save for such
agreement, would have jurisdiction under title 28, in a civil action or in admiralty of the subject
matter of a suit arising out of the controversy between the parties, for an order directing that such
arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in such agreement. . . . The court shall hear the
parties, and upon being satisfied that the making of the agreement for arbitration or the failure to
comply therewith is not in issue, the court shall make an order directing the parties to proceed to
arbitration in accordance with the terms of the agreement. The hearing and proceedings, under
such agreement, shall be within the district in which the petition for an order directing such
arbitration is filed.
9 U.S.C. § 4.
22
This section provides as follows:
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on the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation of §§ 2, 4, and 5 of the FAA, and
specifically its reliance on §§ 4 and 5 to enforce an arbitration agreement that
the district court had found unenforceable under § 2’s “saving clause.”
In Part I, this Essay briefly summarizes the district court and Seventh
Circuit decisions in Campbell v. Keagle. It then argues in Part II that the
Seventh Circuit’s reliance on §§ 4 and 5 to negate § 2’s “saving clause”
conflicts with the text and structure of the FAA and with Supreme Court
jurisprudence, rendering the “saving clause” ineffectual in cases involving
unconscionable arbitration clauses. Further, the court’s reasoning creates a
circuit split regarding the interpretation of these provisions of the FAA, and
reinforces concerns raised by opponents of arbitration in the employment
context. The Essay concludes that while the Seventh Circuit enforced the
parties’ arbitration agreement in Campbell v. Keagle, the court’s reasoning
does not benefit FAA arbitration. Rather, it sets a dangerous precedent for
future cases involving unconscionable arbitration agreements and serves to
amplify the growing backlash against employment arbitration.
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT AND SEVENTH CIRCUIT DECISIONS

Relying on both Illinois and Seventh Circuit case law, the district court
in Campbell v. Keagle found that the parties’ arbitration clause was
“inordinately one-sided” and thus unconscionable.23 That was so, the court
reasoned, primarily because of defendants’ ability to unilaterally control the
choice of arbitrator and the prohibition on plaintiff’s recovery of the fees and
costs of the arbitration, regardless of the outcome.24 The district court’s
conclusion was reinforced by the other terms of the arbitration clause, which
it found “suggestive of bias or one-sidedness,” including defendants’
“exclusive control over the location of arbitration and the arbitration clause’s
silence as to rules that may otherwise be determined by Defendants’ choice
of arbitrator.”25 The district court also refused to sever these unconscionable

If in the agreement provision be made for a method of naming or appointing an arbitrator or
arbitrators or an umpire, such method shall be followed; but if no method be provided therein, or
if a method be provided and any party thereto shall fail to avail himself of such method, or if for
any other reason there shall be a lapse in the naming of an arbitrator or arbitrators or umpire, or
in filling a vacancy, then upon the application of either party to the controversy the court shall
designate and appoint an arbitrator or arbitrators or umpire, as the case may require, who shall act
under the said agreement with the same force and effect as if he or they had been specifically
named therein; and unless otherwise provided in the agreement the arbitration shall be by a single
arbitrator.
9 U.S.C. § 5.
23
Campbell v. Keagle, Inc., 553 F. Supp. 3d 492, 497–98 (C.D. Ill. 2021).
24
Id. at 498.
25
Id.
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provisions in order to compel the parties to arbitration. It noted that this was
not the purpose of §§ 4 and 5 of the FAA,26 and that, under Illinois law, the
“totality of the unconscionable provisions [was] essential to the arbitration
provision such that, absent those provisions, the arbitration provision [was]
meaningless.”27
Defendants appealed the district court’s decision to the Seventh Circuit.
Although defendants did not challenge the district court’s determination that
the parties’ arbitration clause was unconscionable, the Seventh Circuit
seemed to suggest that the district court’s holding in this regard may have
been an error.28 Indeed, in oral argument, the court noted that defendants’
“strongest argument would be that the district judge was wrong about
unconscionability.”29 But since the district court’s finding of
unconscionability was not before the court of appeals, it did not decide this
question.
Defendants’ sole argument on appeal was that the district court should
have severed the unconscionable provisions, “fill[ed] in the blanks,” and
compelled the parties to arbitrate.30 The Seventh Circuit agreed. With respect
to the place of arbitration, the court of appeals found that § 4 of the FAA fills
in this particular “blank.”31 According to the court, § 4 “provides that, in the
absence of a contrary agreement, the arbitration takes place in the same
judicial district as the litigation—here, the Central District of Illinois.”32 The
“blank” regarding “who pays” may be filled, according to the court, “by
some other state or federal statute, such as the Fair Labor Standards Act, on
which Campbell’s suit rests.”33 Yet, the court did not explain whether it based
this contention on § 4 of the FAA, or on the FAA at all. As for “the choice
of arbitrator—who, once selected, can prescribe the procedures if they are
not otherwise determined,” the Seventh Circuit noted that pursuant to § 5 of
26

See id. at 497, 499.
See id. at 499 (quoting Potiyevskiy v. TM Transp., Inc., No. 1–13–1864, 2013 WL 6199949, at *9
(Ill. App. Ct. Nov. 25, 2013)).
28
The Seventh Circuit noted in this regard that the district judge “did not find that the contract
between Campbell and Keagle [was] one-sided; instead he assumed that a rule applicable to a contract as
a whole must be true about each aspect of each clause in it. That’s far from clear to us.” Campbell v.
Keagle Inc., 27 F.4th 584, 585 (7th Cir. 2022). However, it was not open to the district court to find that
the “contract as a whole” was unconscionable. The “separability doctrine” established by the Supreme
Court permits courts to determine only the validity of arbitration clauses rather than the contracts in which
they are contained. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 403–04 (1967).
29
Oral Argument at 6:19, Campbell, 27 F.4th 584 (No. 21-2256), http://media.ca7.uscourts.
gov/sound/2022/lp.21-2256.21-2256_01_07_2022.mp3 [https://perma.cc/8RZY-UZNF].
30
Campbell, 27 F.4th at 586.
31
Id.
32
Id.; 9 U.S.C. § 4; see also supra text accompanying note 21 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 4).
33
Campbell, 27 F.4th at 586.
27

80

117:74 (2022) Two Comes Before Four and Five: The FAA in Campbell v. Keagle

the FAA it is a “judicial duty” for the court to “designate and appoint an
arbitrator” and that “a court cannot scuttle arbitration by declining to name
an arbitrator.”34
Finding that the parties’ “mutual assent to arbitration” survived the
district court’s finding of unconscionability, the Seventh Circuit concluded
that “a federal judge should implement the parties’ decision whenever
possible. That can be done by naming an arbitrator under § 5, and everything
else will take its own course.”35 The court of appeals rejected plaintiff’s
position that this approach “uses § 5 to rewrite an arbitration clause.”36
According to the court, “[i]t would be better to say that § 5 permits (indeed
requires) a judge to name an arbitrator, even if the only thing that survives a
judge’s encounter with the clause is the fact that the parties have agreed to
arbitrate.”37 Thus, the Seventh Circuit vacated the district court’s decision
and remanded the case with instructions to name an arbitrator and to refer
the dispute to arbitration.38
II.

SEQUENCE MATTERS

Whether certain terms of an arbitration agreement are
unconscionable—and if so, whether they should be severed so that
arbitration may nonetheless be compelled—are questions of state contract
law.39 However, the Seventh Circuit in Campbell v. Keagle did not apply
state law to sever those terms of the parties’ arbitration clause that the district
court had found unconscionable and refused to sever. Instead, the court of
appeals relied on §§ 4 and 5 of the FAA to cure those unconscionable terms
and enforce the parties’ arbitration agreement. Yet §§ 4 and 5 cannot bear
the weight of the task that the Seventh Circuit assigned to them. Nothing in
the language or purpose of these procedural provisions authorizes courts to

34

Id.; 9 U.S.C. § 5; see also supra text accompanying note 22 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 5).
Campbell, 27 F.4th at 586.
36
See id.
37
Id.
38
Id. at 587.
39
Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 474 (1989)
(“the interpretation of private contracts is ordinarily a question of state law”); Arthur Andersen LLP v.
Carlisle, 556 U.S. 624, 630–31 (2009) (“‘[S]tate law,’ therefore, is applicable to determine which
contracts are binding under § 2 and enforceable under § 3 ‘if that law arose to govern issues concerning
the validity, revocability, and enforceability of contracts generally.’” (alteration in original) (quoting
Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 493 n.9 (1987)).
35
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enforce arbitration agreements that have been found unenforceable under the
FAA’s substantive provision, § 2.40
Section 4 of the FAA requires a district court to enforce an arbitration
agreement through an affirmative order compelling the parties to arbitrate in
the district where the court is sitting and where the plaintiff commenced
suit.41 Section 5 of the FAA requires a court to appoint an arbitrator upon the
request of a party if an arbitration agreement is silent on the method of
appointment, the method provided for is not complied with, or if “for any
other reason there shall be a lapse in the naming of an arbitrator.”42 While
both sections are mandatory in nature, courts are to compel arbitration under
§ 4 and appoint an arbitrator under § 5 only so long as the arbitration
agreement in question is enforceable under § 2 of the FAA pursuant to state
law.43
Indeed, an arbitration agreement may “require arbitration of every
question under the sun, but that does not necessarily mean the Act authorizes
a court to stay litigation and send the parties to an arbitral forum.”44 Rather,
the Supreme Court has clearly held that “[i]f a party challenges the validity
under § 2 of the precise agreement to arbitrate at issue, the federal court must
consider the challenge before ordering compliance with that agreement
under § 4.”45 If the court accepts the challenge and finds the arbitration
agreement invalid under state law applicable to any contract, there is simply
nothing for it to enforce under § 4. The Supreme Court has applied the same
approach to a stay application under § 3 of the FAA.46

40
Rent-A-Ctr., W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 67–68 (2010) (referring to § 2 as the “primary
substantive provision of the Act,” and to subsequent provisions as “procedures by which federal courts
implement § 2’s substantive rule”); Bedgood v. Wyndham Vacation Resorts, Inc., No. 6:21-cv-418-PGBDCI, 2022 WL 1212165, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 30, 2022) (“[T]he FAA is structured into two parts. First,
Sections 1 and 2 define what agreements can properly be arbitrated, what agreements cannot be arbitrated,
and the relevant exceptions. Second, Sections 3, 4, and 5 create mechanisms for the courts to be able to
enforce arbitration agreements by, respectively, staying litigation, compelling arbitration, and/or
designating a substitute arbitrator. However, ‘the district court can grant the requested relief only if it has
the authority to act under the FAA.’” (internal citations omitted) (quoting Oliveira v. New Prime, Inc.,
857 F.3d 7, 15 (1st Cir. 2017)).
41
This section provides, in relevant part, that “the court shall make an order directing the parties to
proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms of the agreement. The hearing and proceedings, under
such agreement, shall be within the district in which the petition for an order directing such arbitration is
filed.” 9 U.S.C. § 4.
42
9 U.S.C. § 5.
43
See New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, 139 S. Ct. 532, 537–38 (2019).
44
Id.
45
Rent-A-Ctr., 561 U.S. at 71.
46
Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 202 (1956) (“We conclude that the stay
provided in § 3 reaches only those contracts covered by §§ 1 and 2.”).
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There is no reason why the same rationale should not also be applied to
§ 5 of the Act.47 The meaning of “lapse” in § 5 has long been the subject of
a circuit split that emerged in the context of cases where the arbitration forum
designated by the parties in their agreement was unavailable.48 However, the
issue in Campbell v. Keagle was not that an arbitration forum designated by
the parties was unavailable, but rather that their designated method for
appointing the arbitrator was found to be unconscionable by the district
court.49 Whatever the scope of § 5 might be, it cannot be read as permitting
courts to cure a defect (or multiple defects), rendering an arbitration clause
unenforceable under § 2 by appointing an arbitrator and letting “everything
else . . . take its own course.”50 The reason, as with §§ 3 and 4, is that the
FAA’s sequencing is “significan[t]” and “antecedent statutory provisions,”
including § 2, “limit the scope of the court’s powers” under subsequent
sections of the Act.51

47
Section 5 of the FAA provides, in relevant part, that “if no method be provided therein, or if a
method be provided and any party thereto shall fail to avail himself of such method, or if for any other
reason there shall be a lapse in the naming of an arbitrator or arbitrators or umpire, or in filling a
vacancy, then upon the application of either party to the controversy the court shall designate and appoint
an arbitrator or arbitrators or umpire.” 9 U.S.C. § 5 (emphasis added).
48
The Seventh and Third Circuits have found that where the parties’ designated arbitration forum
was unavailable, § 5 enabled them to appoint an arbitrator, thereby interpreting the scope of the section
broadly. See, e.g., Green v. U.S. Cash Advance Ill., LLC, 724 F.3d 787, 791 (7th Cir. 2013) (interpreting
“a lapse in the naming of an arbitrator” in § 5 to mean that “a judge can appoint an arbitrator when for
‘any’ reason something has gone wrong,” including where the designated arbitration forum is
unavailable); Khan v. Dell Inc., 669 F.3d 350, 356–57 (3d Cir. 2012) (finding the unavailability of the
arbitration forum to be a “mechanical breakdown in the arbitrator selection process” that constituted a
“lapse” within the meaning of § 5, and noting that “a narrower construction of Section 5 would be
inconsistent with the ‘liberal federal policy in favor of arbitration’ articulated in the FAA”). But see
Green, 724 F.3d at 797 (7th Cir. 2013) (“[W]hat counts as a lapse . . . has divided a few circuits, but no
circuit has gone as far as the majority goes here.”) (Hamilton, J., dissenting). In contrast, the Second and
Eleventh Circuits have refused to rely on § 5 to appoint an arbitrator when the forum designated by the
parties was unavailable, interpreting the scope of the section more narrowly. See, e.g., Moss v. First
Premier Bank, 835 F.3d 260, 266 (2d Cir. 2016) (recognizing that “there is a difference of opinion among
the circuits on this issue” but refusing to appoint an arbitrator under § 5 because doing so would
“circumvent the parties’ designation of an exclusive arbitral forum”); Inetianbor v. CashCall, Inc.,
768 F.3d 1346, 1350, 1354 (11th Cir. 2014) (finding that “[b]ecause the selected forum is unavailable, a
substitute arbitrator pursuant to 9 U.S.C. § 5 cannot be appointed,” while noting that “[t]his rule is not
without controversy”).
49
See Campbell v. Keagle, 27 F.4th 584, 586 (7th Cir. 2022) (noting that the district court found,
and defendants accepted, that the “provision[] for selecting an arbitrator” is unconscionable).
50
Id.
51
New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, 139 S. Ct. 532, 537–38 (2019). Moreover, § 5 provides that “[i]f in
the agreement provision be made for a method of naming or appointing an arbitrator or arbitrators or an
umpire, such method shall be followed.” 9 U.S.C. § 5. In Campbell, the arbitration agreement did provide
for a method to appoint the arbitrator. The issue was that the specified method was found by the district
court to be unconscionable. 27 F.4th at 586.
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While the Seventh Circuit brushed aside the unconscionable terms of
the parties’ arbitration clause as insignificant details that do not disturb the
parties’ fundamental consent to arbitrate, this reasoning misses the mark. The
question before the district court in this case was not whether the arbitration
agreement “was ever concluded,”52 i.e., whether the plaintiff had assented to
it. Rather, it was whether the arbitration agreement was valid given its
allegedly unconscionable terms to which the plaintiff formally assented. This
question of the arbitration agreement’s validity is to be answered on the basis
of state contract law, and the Seventh Circuit has itself recognized that
arbitration agreements “are not immune from the general principle that
unconscionable contractual provisions are invalid.”53 Even if the parties in
this case had agreed to arbitrate in principle, this does not resolve the
question of the arbitration clause’s enforceability, because a court’s authority
to enforce an arbitration agreement “doesn’t extend to all private contracts,
no matter how emphatically they may express a preference for arbitration.”54
The Seventh Circuit’s reliance on §§ 4 and 5 of the FAA to circumvent
§ 2’s “saving clause” conflicts not only with the Supreme Court’s reading of
the FAA, but also with the approach of other federal courts of appeals in
similar circumstances, creating a circuit split. For instance, in Nino v.
Jewelry Exchange, Inc., the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit held that the parties’ employment arbitration agreement was
substantively unconscionable under state law because, inter alia, it provided
for a one-sided arbitrator selection process and for the parties to bear their
own attorney’s fees, costs, and expenses.55 Similarly, in Newton v. American
Debt Services, Inc., the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
held that the parties’ consumer arbitration agreement was substantively
52
Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 444 n.1 (2006) (noting that the issue of
whether an arbitration agreement “was ever concluded” involved, for instance, whether a party “ever
signed the contract,” whether a signatory “lacked authority to commit the alleged principal,” or whether
a signatory “lacked the mental capacity to assent”).
53
See Jackson v. Payday Fin., LLC, 764 F.3d 765, 778 n.33 (7th Cir. 2014).
54
New Prime, 139 S. Ct. at 537. The Seventh Circuit in Campbell relied on its previous decision in
Green v. U.S. Cash Advance Illinois, LLC, 724 F.3d 787 (7th Cir. 2013) for the proposition that “§ 5
permits (indeed requires) a judge to name an arbitrator, even if the only thing that survives a judge’s
encounter with the clause is the fact that the parties have agreed to arbitrate.” Campbell, 27 F.4th at 586.
But Green did not involve a finding by the district court that the arbitration agreement was invalid under
§ 2 of the FAA. Rather, the district court had dismissed the motion to compel arbitration because it found
that a substitute arbitrator could not be appointed under § 5 of the Act. Green v. U.S. Cash Advance Ill.,
No. 12 C 8079, LLC, 2013 WL 317046, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 25, 2013) (holding that under § 5, “[a]
substitute arbitrator may not be appointed . . . if the provision naming the arbitrator was ‘an integral part
of the agreement’”). In contrast, in Campbell v. Keagle, there was an antecedent finding by the district
court of invalidity under § 2 of the FAA that the court of appeals then proceeded to cure by appointing
an arbitrator under § 5. 27 F.4th at 585–87.
55
Nino v. Jewelry Exch., Inc., 609 F.3d 191, 203–05 (3d Cir. 2010).
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unconscionable under state law because, inter alia, it reserved the selection
of an arbitrator solely to the defendant business and increased the consumer’s
potential liability for attorney’s fees.56 Both courts of appeals further held
that, under the relevant state law, these unconscionable terms could not be
severed from the parties’ arbitration agreements.57 Neither court, however,
proceeded to cure the arbitration agreement’s unconscionability by relying
on §§ 4 and 5 of the FAA, as the Seventh Circuit did in Campbell v. Keagle.
The Seventh Circuit’s unusual interpretation of the FAA in Campbell
v. Keagle might have been motivated by a desire to place the plaintiff “in a
better position” by enforcing the parties’ arbitration agreement as modified
by §§ 4 and 5 of the FAA.58 Indeed, the court crafted a “better deal” for the
plaintiff.59 But this was not the deal she was offered by the defendants and
that she had accepted. That deal provided for arbitration at a location of the
defendants’ choosing, by an arbitrator of the defendants’ choosing, and paid
for by the plaintiff. These terms, as found by the district court and not
contested by the defendants, were unconscionable under state law and,
according to the district court, could not be severed from the parties’
arbitration agreement under state law. As the Supreme Court has reiterated
numerous times, arbitration agreements are to be enforced “according to
their terms,”60 assuming, of course, that those terms are valid under state law
applicable to any contract.61 If, under this law, an arbitration agreement was
never created, was entered into illegally, or some or all of its terms are
unconscionable and cannot be severed, it will be unenforceable under § 2 of
the FAA. Neither § 4 nor § 5 can save such an arbitration agreement from its
fate. Therefore, a court of appeals that enforces such an arbitration agreement
56

Newton v. Am. Debt Servs., Inc., 549 Fed. App’x 692, 694 (9th Cir. 2013).
Nino, 609 F.3d at 207; Newton, 549 Fed. App’x at 695.
58
Oral Argument at 18:12, Campbell v. Keagle Inc., 27 F.4th 584 (7th Cir. 2022) (No. 21-2256),
http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/sound/2022/lp.21-2256.21-2256_01_07_2022.mp3 [https://perma.cc/8RZ
Y-UZNF].
59
See id. at 17:38.
60
See, e.g., Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 682 (2010) (“[W]e have
said on numerous occasions that the central or ‘primary’ purpose of the FAA is to ensure that ‘private
agreements to arbitrate are enforced according to their terms.’”); Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of
Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989) (recognizing “Congress’ principal purpose of
ensuring that private arbitration agreements are enforced according to their terms”); CompuCredit Corp.
v. Greenwood, 565 U.S. 95, 97–98 (2012) (holding that § 2 of the FAA “requires courts to enforce
agreements to arbitrate according to their terms”); Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228,
233 (2013) (“[C]ourts must ‘rigorously enforce’ arbitration agreements according to their terms.”).
Section 4 of the FAA similarly provides that “the court shall make an order directing the parties to proceed
to arbitration in accordance with the terms of the agreement.” 9 U.S.C. § 4.
61
See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 n.12 (1967) (“[T]he
purpose of Congress in 1925 was to make arbitration agreements as enforceable as other contracts, but
not more so.”).
57
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on the basis of §§ 4 and 5 ignores the safeguards provided by § 2’s “saving
clause” and “stand[s] as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the FAA’s
objectives”62—the enforcement of valid arbitration agreements. The
Campbell v. Keagle outcome not only misapplies the FAA as interpreted by
the Supreme Court, but also encourages employers to include similar
unconscionable provisions in standard form employment contracts, safe in
the knowledge that even if an employee sues, the offending provisions will
be severed, and arbitration will still be compelled.63
CONCLUSION
Section 2 of the FAA embodies a “liberal federal policy favoring
arbitration agreements.”64 This liberal federal policy, however, is “at bottom
a policy guaranteeing the enforcement of private contractual
arrangements.”65 Arbitration agreements are thus to be treated as “valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable”—but only so long as no grounds that “exist at
law or in equity for the revocation of any contract” require their
nonenforcement.66 Campbell v. Keagle involved an arbitration clause found
by the district court to be unenforceable under § 2 of the FAA, because it
contained multiple unconscionable terms that were not severable under state
law. The Seventh Circuit’s resort to §§ 4 and 5 of the FAA to uphold the only
surviving element of the parties’ arbitration clause—their “mere agreement
to arbitrate”—constituted “extensive reformation of the arbitration
agreement.”67 Such reformation flouts the Supreme Court’s admonition that
“we do not override the clear intent of the parties, or reach a result
inconsistent with the plain text of the contract, simply because the policy
favoring arbitration is implicated.”68
Moreover, §§ 4 and 5, which appear in the FAA after § 2, are not
designed to restructure arbitration agreements found unenforceable under § 2
so that they can nonetheless be enforced. Rather, only once an arbitration

62

See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 343 (2011).
See Steven L. Brenneman, Urbana Bar Dodges Bullet as Court Orders Another Round in
Arbitration, GREAT LAKES EMP. L. LETTER (Bus. & Learning Res., Brentood, Tenn.), June 2022 (“One
takeaway from the 7th Circuit’s decision might be that employers may load up [arbitration] agreements
with one-sided provisions and then waive those terms if faced with pushback challenging them as
unconscionable.”).
64
Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
65
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 625 (1985).
66
9 U.S.C. § 2.
67
See Newton v. Am. Debt Servs., Inc., 549 Fed. App’x 692, 695 (9th Cir. 2013); see also Green v.
U.S. Cash Advance Ill., LLC, 724 F.3d 787, 800 (2013) (Hamilton J., dissenting) (cautioning that the
majority was “decid[ing] all of the basic questions about arbitration”).
68
EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 294 (2002).
63
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agreement survives the “saving clause” of § 2 must a court assist the parties
by enforcing it according to its terms under § 4 and, if need be, appointing
an arbitrator under § 5. This much is clear from the Supreme Court’s holding
that “antecedent statutory provisions” of the FAA, including § 2, “limit the
scope of the court’s powers” under subsequent sections of the Act.69
The Seventh Circuits’ decision also conflicts with the Supreme Court’s
latest FAA jurisprudence. The Court has recently reiterated the limits of the
FAA’s “policy favoring arbitration,” holding that it is “about treating
arbitration contracts like all others, not about fostering arbitration.”70
Accordingly, the Supreme Court directed that “a court must hold a party to
its arbitration contract just as the court would to any other kind. But a court
may not devise novel rules to favor arbitration over litigation.”71 Yet that is
precisely what the Seventh Circuit did in Campbell v. Keagle—it devised a
novel rule according to which arbitration clauses found unconscionable and
unenforceable under state law could simply be redrafted and enforced under
the FAA. Similarly, the Supreme Court has recently reemphasized that the
interpretation of the FAA must be grounded in its text.72 Nothing in the text
of §§ 4 and 5, however, suggests that these sections permit courts to
circumvent § 2’s “saving clause” by redrafting parties’ arbitration
agreements. To the contrary, both sections explicitly state that such
agreements are to be enforced as written.73
While the Seventh Circuit seems to be an outlier in allowing §§ 4 and 5
of the FAA to defeat § 2’s “saving clause,” the court’s holding creates a
circuit split regarding the internal relationship between these sections of the
Act. Time will tell whether the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning will be adopted
by other courts in future FAA cases, paving the way to the doorstep of the
Supreme Court. Though the Court would likely adhere to its previous
jurisprudence that subsequent procedural sections of the FAA cannot render
enforceable an arbitration agreement found unenforceable under state law
pursuant to § 2 of the Act, Campbell v. Keagle creates uncertainty for parties
to arbitration agreements in the Seventh Circuit and beyond.
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New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, 139 S. Ct. 532, 537 (2019).
Morgan v. Sundance, Inc., 142 S. Ct. 1708, 1713 (2022).
71
Id.
72
Badgerow v. Walters, 142 S. Ct. 1310, 1318 (2022) (referring to the need for “textual support” in
interpreting §§ 4, 9, and 10 of the FAA with regard to federal subject matter jurisdiction).
73
Section 4 states that courts are to direct arbitration to proceed “in the manner provided for in such
agreement,” while § 5 states that the method for appointing an arbitrator provided for in the parties’
agreement “shall be followed.” 9 U.S.C. §§ 4, 5.
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